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We analyse how state university competition to collect resources may affect both research and 
the quality of teaching. By considering a set-up where two state universities behave 
strategically, we model their interaction with potential students as a sequential noncooperative 
game. We show that different types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the mix of 
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discussions. 1 Introduction
Notwithstanding its importance for researchers, the economic literature on education has tradi-
tionally ignored the competition for students and public funding among public universities (Boroah
(1994), De Fraja and Iossa (2002), Johnes (2007), Gautier and Wauthy (2007)). Instead, there
exist several theoretical and empirical papers on competition between private and public schools
and universities (Epple and Romano (1998, 2008), Bailey et al. (2004), Bertola and Checchi (2003),
Oliveira (2006)).
This paper aims to analyse how state university competition to collect resources may a⁄ect
the quality of teaching and the level of research. In this respect, two main remarks are in order.
First, as suggested by Rothschild and White (1995), universities compete for students because
universities adopt a customer-input technology, i.e. students are at once inputs and customers of
the educational process. More precisely, students are inputs needed to produce education, but they
also provide funds to universities both by paying tuition fees and by allowing universities to receive
transfers from the government. In fact, most public funding mechanisms, such as the European ones
for example, have a per-student transfer component in addition to a lump-sum component. Second,
Cohn and Cooper (2004) stress the fact that universities are multi-product institutions that supply
three types of output: teaching, research, and public services. Teaching aims to deliver knowledge
both at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Research, instead, aims to create knowledge with
externalities for all society. Research may be considered as complementary to teaching in the case
of postgraduate courses, while it is probably a substitute in the case of undergraduate courses.
Finally, universities produce a third output which can be thought of as a public service: university
diplomas certify that students have acquired speci￿c competencies. In many countries university
diplomas have a legally recognized value.
We consider a set-up where two state universities behave strategically in the same jurisdiction.1
Their interaction with potential students is thus modelled as a sequential noncooperative game.
Given a public funding mechanism, at the ￿rst stage, the universities choose their tuition fees
and investments in teaching and research; at the second stage, students choose which university
to attend depending on a cost-bene￿t comparison. Under the assumption of perfect mobility of
students, the cost of attending one university only depends on tuition fees (for simplicity, other
costs are assumed to be equal). The bene￿t derived from attending one university or the other,
instead, depends on each student￿ s own ability and on the quality of teaching which includes a peer
group e⁄ect. Consequently also the average ability of students attending each university is relevant
from an individual point of view (Epple and Romano (1998)).
By solving the model, we show that di⁄erent types of equilibrium may arise, depending on the
levels of the public transfers. Each equilibrium is characterized from two points of view: the mix
of research and teaching quality supplied by each university, and the mix of low- and high-ability
students attending each university. On the one side, universities may choose to specialize only in
1See Aghion et al. (2010) for an empirical analysis of the link between university autonomy, competition, and
research performance. See also Veugelers and Van Der Ploeg (2008).
1research or teaching, or instead to supply both. On the other side, students with di⁄erent ability
allocate between universities in di⁄erent ways. We show that there does not exist an equilibrium
where both high- and low-ability students attend both universities. Thus, possible equilibria are the
following: 1) an equilibrium where there is complete segregation and an Ølite institution is created,
i.e. all high-ability students attend one university, and all low-ability students attend the other
university; 2) a mixed equilibrium where all students of one type and part of the students of the other
type attend one university, and the rest attend the other university; 3) a specialized equilibrium
where all students attend one university, and the other institution only produces research. From
a social point of view, we show that the ￿rst equilibrium is the most e¢ cient. When compared to
the second equilibrium, the ￿rst one allows the attainment of higher teaching quality at the same
public extra-research cost. Also research is higher, reaching its technically e¢ cient level. When
compared to the third equilibrium, the ￿rst one allows the same teaching quality and research level
at a lower public cost.
Our paper is related to two strands of economic literature which we try to combine in order to
gather some new hints on university incentives. More speci￿cally, we refer both to the literature
on public university competition, and to the literature on capital tax competition with household
mobility. As we stressed above, competition between public universities has received limited atten-
tion, even if some recent papers have tried to shed some light on the issue. Del Rey (2001) uses a
spatial competition model to analyse a game between two universities which provide both research
and teaching, and use admission standards to control the average ability of enrolled students. De-
pending on preferences and technologies di⁄erent types of symmetric equilibrium may arise: both
universities admit only some of the applicants and provide research; both universities satisfy all
students￿demand and provide research; both are ￿ teaching only￿universities; both are ￿ research
only￿universities. In a related paper, De Fraja and Iossa (2002) focus attention on how students￿
mobility costs may a⁄ect the equilibrium con￿guration. In particular, if mobility costs are high,
as in Del Rey (2001), the equilibrium is symmetric: both universities admit the same number of
students, and research investments are the same. If mobility costs are su¢ ciently low, instead, the
resulting equilibrium (provided it exists) is asymmetric, i.e. one university (the ￿ Ølite institution￿ )
admits the best students, and provides more research than the other.2 More recently, Kemnitz
(2007) examines how di⁄erent public funding schemes may a⁄ect competition between universities,
and thus the quality of their teaching and research. Hubner (2009) extends the previous analyses by
showing that the introduction of tuition fees can raise the quality of education and the number of
students when both central and local governments lack su¢ cient instruments to tax the high-skilled
population.
Contrary to what happens with university competition, the literature on capital tax competition
is quite large (for surveys see Wellish (2000), Hindriks and Myles (2006)). In this respect, a
familiar result is that tax competition for perfectly mobile capital results in underprovision of
2Optimal research and teaching decisions are also analysed by De Fraja and Valbonesi (2009) who, however,
assume that in each local education market there is a single university that acts as a monopolist because no mobility
of students is allowed.
2local public goods when households are perfectly immobile. Such a result, however, does not hold
when households are allowed to be perfectly mobile. Fiscal externalities, which are at the basis
of the result on local public good underprovision, disappear when households are mobile: each
region/country internalizes the e⁄ects of its own policies on the welfare of non-residents by taking
the migration equilibrium into account. Accordingly, introducing mobility of households in the
standard capital tax competition model mitigates the downward pressure on local public goods
provision (Wellish 2000, p.105).
In the present paper we use the methodological tools o⁄ered by the literature on capital tax
competition in order to analyse how student mobility a⁄ects university competition on both tuition
fees, and expenditure in research and teaching. To the best of our knowledge this represents a
novelty with respect to the existing literature which uses spatial competition models to analyse state
university competition, and does not allow universities to set tuition fees. The main contribution
of this paper is to characterize di⁄erent con￿gurations of the university system (Ølite institution,
mixed system and specialization in research) in a uni￿ed framework, where the di⁄erences depend
on the public transfers chosen by the government. This allows us to select the Ølite system as the
most e¢ cient. On the contrary, existing literature on state university competition does not analyse
the role of the government in shaping the university system. Further, in our paper, universities do
not set admission standards, thus students are free to attend the university they prefer on the basis
of a cost-bene￿t analysis. This scenario ￿ts the European set-up better than the U.S. one, and is
probably more suitable to describe undergraduate degrees.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses students￿
university choice and characterizes three di⁄erent type of stable equilibria that may arise. Section
4 examines how universities compete with respect to their choice of tuition fees and expenditure
for research and teaching. Section 5 compares the outcomes of the three equilibria from a social
point of view. Finally, section 6 contains some concluding remarks. All the proofs can be found in
the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider two universities denoted by j, j = A;B, operating in the same jurisdiction, and (possibly)
di⁄ering with respect to quality of teaching, qj, and level of research, rj. Students have to choose
which university to attend. Students di⁄er with respect to their ability, ei, which can be high, eh,
or low, el, with eh > el. The preferences of the students are represented by the following utility
function
Ui(qj) ￿ bj; i = h;l; j = A;B; (1)
where bj > 0 denotes the per-student tuition fee paid to university j. We assume that high-ability
students derive a higher level of utility from any given level of qj > 0, i.e. Uh(qj) > Ul(qj), and
Ui(0) = 0, i = h;l. We also assume that university quality positively a⁄ects students￿utility at a
decreasing rate, dUi
dqj > 0, d2Ui
d(qj)2 < 0 with dUh
dqj > dUl
dqj . Further, the reservation level of utility of both




where Nh is the total number of high-ability students, and Nl the total number of low-ability
students with Nl ￿ N=2: Thus, it is N = nA + nB; where nj denotes the total number of students
attending university j, j = A;B; i.e. all students attend one of the two universities.3 Moreover, ni
j,
i = h;l, denotes the total number of students belonging to each type and attending each university








j, i = h;l. Let us denote with ej the average
ability of students attending university j. Accordingly, the average ability of students attending











￿ + el; j = A;B; (2)
with ￿ ￿ eh ￿ el.
Each university may receive two types of transfer from the government. Let tj ￿ 0 denote a
per-student transfer to university j, and ￿j ￿ 0 denote a lump-sum transfer, j = A;B. Accordingly,
the budget constraint of university j, j = A;B, obtains as
(tj + bj)nj + ￿j = Tj + Rj; j = A;B; (3)
where Tj ￿ 0 and Rj ￿ 0 represent expenditure on teaching and research by university j, j = A;B,
respectively. Notice that universities are not constrained in the destination of the transfers. The
sums thus received can be used either to ￿nance teaching or research.
Each university produces teaching according to the following production function4
qj = ￿ej + ￿
Tj
nj; when nj > 0; ￿;￿ > 0; (4)
qj = 0; when nj = 0; j = A;B:
Teaching quality can be improved by augmenting the average quality of the students and/or teach-
ing expenditure, for example by increasing the teacher/students ratio. The parameters ￿ and ￿;
measure how the peer group e⁄ect and per-student teaching expenditure, respectively, translate
into teaching quality and are the same in both universities. The quality of teaching is assumed to
be independent of research. This means that we mostly refer to undergraduate courses.
Further, each university produces research according to the following production function with
decreasing returns5
3In other words, we consider only those young people who bene￿t from university education. We assume that
secondary school performance is informative enough to divide school leavers between potential university students
and workers.
4This is a common form for the teaching production function, see e.g. Del Rey (2001). Notice that this production
function implies that qj > 0 even if Tj = 0. This can be interpreted in two ways. We can assume that when nj > 0,
Tj is always higher than the minimum level needed to be active in teaching. Alternatively, even if universities devote
no funds to teaching, they can be thought to operate as a screening device or as a network that makes attendance
bene￿cial to students anyway, as in Del Rey (2001).
5See also Gautier and Wauthy (2007).
4rj = R
￿j
j ; j = A;B; 0 < ￿j < 1, (5)
where ￿j represents an index of e¢ ciency of research activity speci￿c to each university. Then, each
university can improve the quality of its research by augmenting its expenditure on research activity,
for example, by recruiting better researchers and by purchasing more sophisticated equipment.






jqj + rj; j = A;B; (6)
according to which, in the intent of the universities, there is perfect substitutability between total
quality of teaching and research.6
The game is solved by backward induction. We ￿rst examine the students￿decisions on which
university to attend and then the universities￿ decisions on tuition fees, research and teaching
expenditure.
3 Students￿university choice and characterization of stable equi-
libria
Consider the second stage of the game when students make their decisions. If both universities
enrol students of a given type, at equilibrium, those students must be indi⁄erent with respect to
which university to attend. This implies that the following arbitrage condition has to hold7
Ui(qA) ￿ bA = Ui(qB) ￿ bB; i = h;l: (7)
Recall that the quality of teaching depends on per-student expenditure and on average student
ability. It is consequently a⁄ected both by the number of students and by the proportion of high-
ability individuals. By substituting (4), and (3) into (1), the e⁄ect of the number of students on



















dqj > 0 by assumption. By using (2) and (3) into (4),












; i = h;l; j = A;B; (9)
6In order to sum up the two components of the objective function, qj and rj indexes must be normalized. The
same type of objective function is also used by Del Rey (2000) and a similar one by de Fraja and Iossa (2002). The
latter assume that universities are interested in maximising their prestige which is formalized as a function of the
number of students, the average ability of the student body, and research expenditure. More recently, De Fraja
and Valbonesi (2008) suppose that universities are only interested in maximising their amount of research, so that
teaching is not an end in itself, but a means to fund research.
7This condition is quite familiar in the literature on tax competition with household mobility. See for instance
Wellish (2000, p.111).










j + ￿ (Rj ￿ ￿j)
i
; j = A;B; (10)










j + ￿ (Rj ￿ ￿j)
i
; j = A;B: (11)
Notice that the e⁄ect of the number of students of type i, ni, on teaching quality of university j
depends on two terms. The ￿rst one represents the direct e⁄ect of an additional student on average
ability and is positive (negative) for high (low) ability students. Notice that for each university,
the e⁄ect of the number of high (low) ability students on the quality of teaching depends on the
number of low (high) ability students. The second term represents the indirect e⁄ect of an additional
student on per-student teaching expenditure and is positive (negative) if research expenditure is
higher (lower) than the lump-sum transfer. The reason is that an excess of research expenditure
over the lump-sum transfer has to be ￿nanced by the fees paid by students. When the lump-sum
transfer exceeds research expenditure, instead, an additional student subtracts per-capita teaching
resources.




; i = h;l, is determined in the
following






























, i = h;l, j = A;B, is crucial in determining the type of locally stable equilibrium
which occurs at the students￿subgame. In this respect, we can state the following
Proposition 1 There does not exist an equilibrium where each university is attended by both types
of students.
The reason why there cannot exist an equilibrium where both h and l students are found in
both universities is that such undi⁄erentiated structure contradicts the arbitrage condition, i.e. the
requirement that the utility levels must be the same in both universities for each type of students.
Given the di⁄erence in marginal utilities, if the utility achievable in the two universities is equalized
for one type, it cannot be equalized for the other type. We are then left with the following three
kinds of equilibria:8
Equilibrium E (Ølite university system): all h students attend university A and all l students
attend university B.
8More precisely, for each type, there actually exist two symmetric equilibria. The second one can be obtained by
simply exchanging the subscript A for B and viceversa.
6Equilibrium M (mixed university system): all students of one type and part of the students of
the other type attend university A and the rest attend university B.
Equilibrium S (specialized university system): all students attend university A. University B
only produces research.
In the following we focus on locally stable equilibria, and derive the conditions on public transfers
which characterize each kind of equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium E: An Ølite university system
In this equilibrium a process of perfect segregation takes place. Formally, for all h students to





































From the above conditions we can derive the following


















Proposition 2 identi￿es two speci￿cations of equilibrium E. In equilibrium E1, teaching quality
and tuition fee reach the same level in both universities. In equilibrium E2, both the teaching
quality and the tuition fee are higher in university A; where all h students are enrolled, than in
university B, which is attended only by l students.













< 0. By Lemma 1, this equilibrium (with
nl
A = nh
B = 0) arises only if








In university B, the lump-sum transfer must exceed research expenditure by an amount representing
the compensation for the lower quality of its students while in university A the lump-sum transfer
can fall short of research expenditure by an amount proportional to the higher quality of its students.
In both universities, an increase in the number of students lowers the teaching quality. In section





9We assume that universities ￿x tuition fees without taking into account the marginal e⁄ect of a student movement
on teaching quality. Given that N is large, such e⁄ect is negligible.
73.2 Equilibrium M: A mixed university system
Recalling that in this equilibrium both types of students attend university A while university B
is attended by students of the same type, we distinguish two speci￿cations according to the type
found in university B. In equilibrium M1, university B is attended by low-ability students while
in equilibrium M2, university B is attended by high-ability students.
3.2.1 Equilibrium M1
Formally, for all h students and part of l students to attend university A and the rest of l students
























































< 0, j = A;B. This means
that, at equilibrium, quality decreases with low-ability students for both universities. By Lemma
1, this implies




￿B ￿ RB > 0: (18)
For university B, the lump-sum transfer ￿B must exceed research expenditure. Funds in excess can
be used to improve teaching quality. As a consequence of the high lump-sum transfer, university
B has no need to attract too many (l) students. For university A, ￿A may exceed or be lower than
RA. In university A, there may be an incentive to attract students in order to ￿nance teaching and
possibly research.
Further, we derive the impact of universities￿decisions on the location of low-ability students,
by stating the following



























< 0; j = A;B.
Lemma 2 shows that the number of low-ability students attending one university depends
negatively on Rj. The higher the value of ￿, the greater the e⁄ect because Rj represents resources
10Notice that condition (15) cannot hold as an equality by the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 1
to exclude that both types are shared between the universities.
8that are subtracted from teaching expenditure. In Section 4.2, we show that also
dnl
j
dbj < 0. Notice
that such a negative e⁄ect is greater the lower the value of ￿, i.e. the lower the impact of per-student
teaching expenditure on quality. With a low ￿, a large number of low-ability students decide to
move away from the university, which raises the tuition fee. The location choice of high-ability
students is not a⁄ected by marginal changes in bj and Rj, because the corresponding solution is a
corner one.
As to the relation between tuition fees and teaching quality in university A and B, we can state
the following









Notice that teaching quality and tuition fees are higher in the university where high-ability
students are enrolled and average ability is higher.
3.2.2 Equilibrium M2
In this speci￿cation of equilibrium M, university A is attended by both types of students, while
university B is attended only by high-ability students. Formally, for all l students and part of h
students to attend university A and the rest of h students to attend university B, the following




































































< 0. This means that, at equilibrium, quality decreases with the number of students for both
universities. By Lemma 1, this implies




￿B ￿ RB > 0: (22)
For university A, the lump-sum transfer ￿A must exceed research expenditure so as to compensate
for the lower ability of part of its students. Funds in excess can thus be used to improve teaching
quality. Also for university B, ￿B must exceed RB so that per capita teaching resources diminish
11Again condition (19) cannot hold as an equality by the same argument of the proof of Proposition 1.
9with the enrolment of students. If this were not the case, all h ability students would migrate to
university B.
Again, we derive the impact of universities￿decisions on the location of low-ability students, by
stating the following that can be interpreted along the same lines as Lemma 2.



























< 0; j = A;B.
Finally, as to the relation between tuition fees and teaching quality in university A and B, we
can state the following









Notice that teaching quality and tuition fees are higher in the university where only high-ability
students are enrolled and average ability is higher.
3.3 Equilibrium S: A specialized university system
In this equilibrium, university B is fully specialized, i.e. there are no students and only research
is carried on. University A, on the contrary, produces both teaching and research. Formally, for
all students to choose university A, so that university B only produces research, the following















￿ bA ￿ b Ui > 0; i = h;l;
where bB = 0, and b Ui represents the level of utility that a student of ability i could obtain if
teaching activity were started in university B, based only on his tuition payment. In order for this




> 0, i = h;l. By Lemma 1, this implies that








> 0, i = h;l,
by Lemma 1. In other words, this means that equilibrium S may arise only if i) university A￿ s
investment in research, RA, is greater than the lump-sum transfer, ￿A, so that part of the fees are
used to ￿nance research, and ii) the e⁄ect of an increase in the number of low-ability students on
university A￿ s investment in teaching is greater than the e⁄ect on university A￿ s average ability of
students. University B only produces research, and thus the government only provides a lump-sum
transfer which is entirely spent on research.
Further, at equilibrium S, the location choices of both high and low-ability students are not
a⁄ected by marginal changes in universities￿decisions.
104 University competition: Research expenditure and tuition fees
At the ￿rst stage of the game, each university solves its maximization problem in accordance with
the type of equilibrium arising at the second stage. In particular, each university behaves ￿ la Nash
with respect to its competitor but is a Stackelberg leader with respect to students. This means
that each university decides tuition fees bj, and research expenditure Rj, taking into account the
reaction of students, i.e. their subsequent location decisions. Starting from each equilibrium of
the second stage, we then solve the ￿rst stage considering that the objective function (6) must
incorporate the corresponding equilibrium.
4.1 Equilibrium E: An Ølite university system
Considering that, at equilibrium E of the second stage, the students￿location decisions are such
that nA = Nh, nB = Nl, the universities￿objective functions (6) take the following form




WB = Nl￿el + ￿[(tB + bB)Nl + (￿B ￿ RB)] + R
￿B
B :
Accordingly, the ￿rst-order conditions w.r.t. Rj, j = A;B, are
@Wj=@Rj = ￿jR
￿j￿1
j ￿ ￿ = 0; j = A;B: (23)
As far as the tuition fees are concerned, we have that both universities payo⁄s are monotonic
increasing functions of bj, j = A;B. Tuition fees are then bound by the characteristics of the
equilibrium itself (see section 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Optimal research expenditure
From (23), the optimal level of research expenditure, RE








; j = A;B; (24)








; j = A;B:
The optimal level of research is given by two technological parameters ￿ and ￿j. The ￿rst represents
the impact of per-student teaching expenditure on the quality of teaching (e¢ cacy of teaching
expenditure), and the second is the coe¢ cient transforming expenditure in e⁄ective research activity
(e¢ cacy of research expenditure). Given that ￿j < 1, rE
j is increasing in ￿j and decreasing in ￿:
The greater the e¢ cacy of research expenditure, the higher the optimal level of research. The
greater the e¢ cacy of teaching, on the contrary, the lower the amount of research expenditure
11and consequently the level of research because the higher is its opportunity cost. Recall that it is




@￿j = 0, and
@RE
j
@tj = 0; i.e. expenditure on research is independent of
the lump-sum transfer by the central government as well as of the per-student transfer. Marginal
changes in ￿j and tj only a⁄ect the quality of teaching.
4.1.2 Optimal per-student tuition fee










Equilibrium E1: Given that the payo⁄ of the universities is monotonically increasing in bj, each
university chooses the highest possible value of b
E1
j , j = A;B, compatible with this equilibrium.
Such values result from the solution to the system of equations (12) and (13), when they hold as
equalities. Proposition 2 shows that the quality of teaching is the same in both universities and
that the same tuition fee is charged. Low-ability students, even if segregated, are not penalized in
terms of quality of teaching and pay exactly the same as high-ability ones.
The next Corollary to Proposition 2 shows that the government must give relatively higher
per-capita transfers to university B, where the di⁄erence in the transfers between B and A is given
by the amount compensating for the lower ability of university B￿ s students.



















Corollary 1 implies that the transfer to university B, net of the compensation for the lower




A , the per-
capita lump-sum transfer net of research cost to university A must be equal to the excess of the
net per-capita lump-sum transfer over ability compensation to university B.





A = bE1, but it does not impose any constraint on the level of the fee. As a consequence,
considering that the payo⁄of each university is monotonically increasing in bj and considering that















￿ bE1 = 0: (25)
Thus, low-ability students are kept at their reservation level of utility while high-ability students
enjoy higher utility because Uh(qj) > Ul(qj). For university B, equation (25) shows that t
E1
B and
bE1 are complements. A higher level of t
E1
B (and the consequent increase in t
E1
A implied by Corollary
1) in fact enables the universities to raise bE1 and, consequently, to further raise teaching quality.
Notice that for equilibrium E1 to exist, public transfers must be su¢ ciently high. If this is not








￿, i.e. for high-ability
12students the marginal utility from an increase in bA would be higher than the marginal cost. As a
consequence, university A could raise the tuition fee and hence its teaching quality.
Equilibrium E2: For this equilibrium, Proposition 2 shows that the quality of teaching and the
tuition fee in university A are higher than in university B. The level of b
E2



















B = 0; (26)
while the level of b
E2



























By Lemma 1, we then have the same stability condition as in equilibrium E1 (see (14)). Again,
university B is compensated for the lower quality of its students. Notice that, contrary to what





Considering (27), the following Corollary to Proposition 2 holds






















4.2 Equilibrium M: A mixed university system
In this equilibrium university A is attended by both types of students, while university B is attended
only by low-ability students in equilibrium M1, and only by high-ability students in equilibrium
M2. Denoting by i the type of students that attend both universities, so that i = l in equilibrium
M1 and i = h in equilibrium M2, we then have that nA = ni
A + N￿i and nB = ni
B, and we can
write university j￿ s maximization problem as follows
max
bj;Rj
Wj = njqj + rj






(tj + bj)nj + ￿j = Tj + Rj;













@bj = 0 in equilibrium M2, the













j = 0; (28)
12We consider parameter values such that these conditions are also su¢ cient for a maximum. Notice that Lemma













Notice that (29) implies that
@ni
j
@bj < 0 (see Lemma 2 and 3).
4.2.1 Optimal research expenditure
Substituting (29), the solution of (28) gives the optimal level of research expenditure R
Mk
















































> 0; i = l when k = 1 ; i = h when k = 2:
D
Mk
j is positive because
dnl
j
dbj < 0. Thus, considering that
@ni
j
@Rj < 0 by Lemma 2 and 3, it follows that
￿
Mk
j is positive too. Notice that D
Mk
j is an index of tuition fee competition, because it measures
the semi-elasticity of students with respect to the fee, i.e. the percentage of student out￿ ight due
to an increase in the fee. Further, ￿
Mk
j is an index of the student out￿ ight due to an increase in
expenditure on research, relatively to the index of tuition fee competition D
Mk
j . If university j
increases its expenditure in research, students tend to leave because, everything else being equal,
expenditure in teaching is reduced.
While in equilibrium E1 and E2, rE
j was determined by technological parameters, now r
Mk
j













j is low, r
Mk
j tends to be determined only by technological parame-














j , k = 1;2.
















dRj from Lemma 2 into (31), ￿
M1















dqj < 1=￿ because we know that
dnl
j













B , unless ￿A is much lower than ￿B. Exactly the same argument can be applied
to equilibrium M2 by substituting h for l.
4.2.2 Optimal per-student tuition fee





























































j , j = A;B, k = 1;2, decreases with ￿=￿, ei, and D
Mk
j .
Consider equilibrium M1. In university A, the level of the tuition fee is not so high as to
discourage too many low-ability students from enrolling; in university B, it is high enough to avoid
being attended by all low-ability students (which would be the case covered by equilibrium E).




B . Thus, in university B, part of the lump-sum transfer
is devoted to ￿nance teaching and this helps raise teaching quality. Given that university B has
no high-ability students, its quality would otherwise be too low. Such a positive e⁄ect on quality




B , however, increases as the number of students diminishes. For university A,
instead, ￿
M1
A can be either lower or higher than R
M1
A . If it is lower, students contribute to ￿nancing
both teaching and research.
A similar comment applies to equilibrium M2. Now the level of b
M2
A must not be so high as to
discourage any low-ability student to enrol in university A, and b
M2
B must be high enough so as not





￿￿Nl so as to compensate for the
presence of all low-ability students, and in university B the lump-sum transfer must exceed research
expenditure. The relation between the public transfers to the two universities is determined in the
following corollary to Proposition 4.



























15Finally, notice that in equilibrium M, given (33) and (34), the tuition fee and the per-student
transfer can be substitute,13 contrary to what happens in equilibrium E. Now the tuition fee
has an opportunity cost for university j, because of students￿response. In equilibrium E, such
opportunity cost does not exist as university j does not gain anything by marginally reducing b
Ek
j
(the derivative of the university objective function w.r.t. b
Ek
j is always positive). In equilibrium M,
instead, university j directly gains by marginally reducing b
Mk
j because it can attract students.
4.3 Equilibrium S: A specialized university system












Accordingly for university A, the f.o.c. w.r.t research expenditure is
@WA=@RA = ￿AR
￿A￿1
A ￿ ￿ = 0; (35)
while w.r.t the tuition fee bA, the pay-o⁄is monotonically increasing. For university B, we obviously
have that the pay-o⁄ is increasing in research expenditure.
4.3.1 Optimal research expenditure



















For university B, the optimal level of research expenditure, RS
B, is simply
RS












13They are substitute unless the semi-elasticity of low ability students w.r.t. the fee decreases so much with the
per-student transfer as to counterbalance the direct e⁄ect of tj:






wise university B would have an incentive to use part of the lump-sum transfer to start teaching
activity.
In university A, where all the students are, the level of expenditure in research is the same as
that in both speci￿cations of equilibrium E. Again, RS
A depends only on technological parameters,
and thus it is independent of the public lump-sum transfer, i.e.
@RS
A
@￿A = 0. Now however ￿A < RA
and students fees are partly used to ￿nance research. In university B, only research is carried on,




4.3.2 Optimal per-student tuition fee
At equilibrium S, the government does not ￿nance teaching at university B, and consequently
tB = 0. In order that university B does not ￿nd it pro￿table to start teaching activity ￿nanced
only by tuition fees, the tuition fee of university A must not be too high
bS










A = V i; (38)
and










B = ￿ei + ￿bi
B.















otherwise the RHS of (38) is always higher than the LHS.
Given that V i > 0, in this equilibrium both types of students obtain a positive level of utility.
Now
Uh (qA) ￿ bS
A > Ul (qA) ￿ bS
A > 0; (39)
i.e. high-ability students enjoy a higher level of utility than low-ability ones.
As in equilibrium E, tA and bS
A are complements, being the tuition fee with no opportunity cost.
A higher level of tA in fact enables university A to raise bS
A and, consequently, to raise teaching
quality.
5 A social comparison among equilibria
In order to compare the three equilibria from a social point of view, we suppose that the government
aims to obtain a high level of both total research and teaching quality, subject to an e¢ cient use of
17￿nancial resources. As we adopt a partial equilibrium approach taking into account only students￿
utility, we do not consider a welfarist objective function for the government. In other words, we
consider research and teaching quality as objectives per se, although their provision is constrained by
budget concerns. Both research and teaching quality could in fact be considered as instruments for
human capital accumulation and then for growth. In the following, we make pairwise comparisons
between equilibria, and then we show that equilibrium E2 is the most e¢ cient.
Equilibrium E2 vs. equilibrium E1: Recall that in equilibrium E, university A is an Ølite
institution attended only by high-ability students, and university B is only attended by low-ability
students. Notice that the level of research is the same in both speci￿cations of this equilibrium which
then di⁄ers only as to teaching quality. The level of the public transfers is crucial in determining
the speci￿cation that is achieved. In order to have the same teaching quality, in equilibrium E1
the government must compensate university B for the lower quality of its students and then give
the same amount of resources to both universities. In equilibrium E2 a higher teaching quality in
university A can be obtained by transferring more funds to it (after compensating university B for
the lower quality of its students through the lump-sum transfer). Recall that for equilibrium E1 to
exist, public transfers must be high enough, otherwise only equilibrium E2 may obtain. If this is
the case, we can prove the following
Proposition 5 For a given level of public expenditure, equilibrium E2 allows a higher average
teaching quality than equilibrium E1.
Thus we may say that equilibrium E2 is more e¢ cient than equilibrium E1.
Equilibrium E2 vs. equilibrium M2: Let us now compare equilibrium E2 to equilibrium M2,
recalling that in the latter university A is attended by both types of students while university B is
only attended by high-ability students. We know that in equilibrium E research is at its technically
e¢ cient level and is higher than in equilibrium M. Given that also research expenditure is then
higher in equilibrium E, we compare the two equilibria in terms of equal levels of extra research
resources, i.e. total public transfers net of expenditure devoted to research activity. In this respect,
we state the following
Proposition 6 For equal levels of extra-research resources, average teaching quality is higher in
equilibrium E2 than in equilibrium M2.
Proposition 6 means that at the same teaching cost, teaching quality is higher in the segregated
state university system of equilibrium E2 than in the mixed state university system of equilibrium
M2.
Equilibrium E1 vs. equilibrium M1: We may then compare equilibrium E1 to equilibrium
M1, recalling that in the latter university A is attended by both types of students while university
B is only attended by low-ability students.
18Proposition 7 For equal levels of extra-research resources, average teaching quality is higher in
equilibrium E1 than in equilibrium M1.
Proposition 7 means that, at the same teaching cost, teaching quality is higher in the Ølite
university system of equilibrium E1 than in the mixed university system of equilibrium M1. Con-
sidering that equilibrium E1 is dominated by equilibrium E2; we may say that equilibrium E2
dominates equilibrium M1:
Equilibrium E1 vs. equilibrium S: Let us ￿nally compare equilibrium E1 and S. In the latter,
university A supplies both research and teaching, and is attended by all students, while university
B is only a research institution.
Proposition 8 For any given level of teaching quality and research, public expenditure is lower in
equilibrium E1 than in equilibrium S.
In terms of resource allocation, this proposition implies that equilibrium E1 is more e¢ cient
than equilibrium S. Since equilibrium E1 is in turn dominated by equilibrium E2, the government
should choose the structure of grants corresponding to equilibrium E2.
According to our propositions, we may conclude that equilibrium E2 is more e¢ cient than all the
other equilibria. The question arises whether the government can e⁄ectively implement equilibrium
E2 by choosing appropriate public transfers. The following proposition provides su¢ cient conditions
on the lump-sum and the per-student transfers that guarantee that E2 and not another equilibrium
will be selected. Let us de￿ne R
Mk
j min as the minimum value that can be taken by R
Mk
j in equilibrium
Mk, j = A;B; k = 1;2: We then show
























Nh > tB + b
E2






￿ > 0: (42)
Conditions (40)-(42) are not more restrictive than the necessary conditions for equilibrium E2
to exist and be stable (see Corollary 2 and subsequent discussion). In other words Proposition 9
does not impose additional conditions on the total amount of public transfers but simply points
out how to shape them in order to avoid multiple equilibria.
Finally notice that, if the government has an equity concern about the average teaching quality
of the university system, equilibrium E1 could be preferred.14 Moreover, if the government should
14To implement equilibrium E1 instead of equilibrium E2 the government should give per student transfer that are
su¢ ciently high and satisfy the condition in Corollary 1. Moreover for E1 to be stable the lump sum transfers must
satisfy (14).
19decide to devote very low resources to the university sector, there could be not enough funds to
￿nance the solution designed by equilibria E, and equilibrium M1 might be preferred.15
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the impact of student mobility on the characteristics of two competing state
universities. Assuming there are two types of students (￿ high-ability￿and ￿ low-ability￿ ), the com-
position of the population of students impacts on the quality of teaching (￿ peer e⁄ect￿ ). The latter
is an argument of the individual utility function as well as of the universities￿objective functions.
The level of research (which is linked to research expenditure by e¢ ciency parameters) is the other
argument of the universities￿objective functions. Each university decides the level of its tuition
fees and of its research expenditure. The government contributes to ￿nancing the universities with
a lump-sum transfer and a matching grant per-student. The aim of the government is to promote
a high level of research and teaching quality by making an e¢ cient use of ￿nancial resources.
By selecting locally stable equilibria, the analysis has ruled out some institutional settings in
favour of some others. One of the main results is that there cannot exist a stable equilibrium where
both high- and low-ability students divide between di⁄erent universities. We have then three types
of equilibria. In equilibrium E, an Ølite institution is created with only high-ability students while
low-ability students are segregated in a di⁄erent institution. In equilibrium M, all students of one
type and part of the students of the other type attend one university while the rest attend the
other university. In equilibrium S, all students are concentrated in one university, while the other
institution becomes a research center.
Equilibrium E stands out as the most e¢ cient. When compared to equilibrium M, equilibrium
E allows the attainment of a higher teaching quality at the same public extra research cost. In
equilibrium E, the level of research expenditure is at its e¢ cient level being entirely explained by
the technological parameters of the research production function. Thus, research productivity is
crucial in de￿ning the level of public expenditure. When compared to equilibrium S, equilibrium
E allows the same teaching quality and research level at a lower public cost.
Concerning the debate on the appropriate form for the universities￿objective function, one
could think that universities maximize average teaching quality instead of total teaching quality in
addition to research as in the present paper. We have checked that equilibrium E is robust to such
a change and therefore our results still hold.
15Equilibrium M1 requires lower transfers than equilibrium E1 and E2. Recall in fact that local stability conditions










h for equilibrium E1. For
equilibrium M1 instead, ￿B > R
M1









j ; j = A;B: Moreover in equilibrium
E1 and E2 the per-student transfers are constrained by the conditions in Corollary 1 and 2, respectively, while in
equilibrium M1 there are no constraints and thus could be equal to zero. Notice that, as regards equilibrium E2, the
condition in Corollary 2 counterbalances the fact that ￿
E2
A can be very low.
207 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows directly by signing (10) and (11).
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose, contrary to proposition 1, that there exists an equilibrium
where students of both types l and h attend both universities A and B: The following arbitrage




















































































dqj the proposition is immediately proved.￿









































@bBdbB + dbB = 0:
(43)








































< 0 for equilibrium M1 to be stable, Jl < 0 in (46) because
@Ul
j





















































































































from (15) and (16). But the inequalities cannot be satis￿ed because of the assumption dUh
dqj > dUl
dqj :￿
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof exactly follows that of Lemma 2 with superscripts h in place of
l:￿
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows the same argument of Proposition 3.￿







￿￿ is strictly positive because of stability condi-


















































￿￿ is strictly positive because of stability condi-















































is strictly positive because of stability condition



















































































A (see Proposition 4) and nh




































































22Proof of Proposition 5.
Starting from a given equilibrium E1, we want to prove that, by appropriately redistributing
public resources, an equilibrium E2 can be generated that has a higher average teaching quality than
that of the equilibrium E1. Notice that in both equilibria E2 and E1, it must be ￿B ￿RB > ￿
￿￿Nl
while in equilibrium E2 there are no restrictions on ￿A ￿RA. Given qE1, the government can then
decrease tB by an amount ￿ > 0, and correspondingly increase tA by ￿ Nl
Nh, where Nl
Nh ￿ 1. If the




B = bE1, total quality would not change,
then qE1N = q
E2
A Nh + q
E2
B Nl: However, the decrease in tB implies a decrease in bB; as (26) must
be satis￿ed and dUl




jq=qE1￿(￿ + ￿bB) = ￿bB: (47)





Nh + ￿bA) = ￿bA + ￿(￿); (48)


















B > Uh ￿
qE1￿
￿ bE1;
and in equilibrium E1
dUh
dq jq=qE1 < 1=￿ must be satis￿ed. Moreover, ￿(￿) ! 0 as ￿ ! 0, i.e. as
q
E2

















Nh ￿ 1 and ￿(￿) increasing, the government can ￿nd a level of ￿ such
that ￿bANh > ￿bBNl implying that the increase in qA more than compensates for the decrease in
qB making the average teaching quality increase. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6.






























B > 0; "M2, ￿
M2 > 0. If the government induces an equilibrium E2 where the

































































< 1=￿ at equilibrium M2, and (50) holds, using condition (27) it follows that

















B ￿ zM2: (51)
In order to prove that the teaching quality for the high-ability students is higher in equilibrium
E2 than in equilibrium M2 for equal extra-research costs, let the government give the following













so that the extra-research cost is the same in equilibrium E2 as in equilibrium M2: Notice that




A also imply that the extra-research per-capita transfer for high ability
students in equilibrium E2 is the same as the average extra-research per-capita transfer for high








































where in equilibrium M2 we do not consider the amount ￿
￿￿Nl for university A because it is
attributed to low-ability students in order to reach quality level q
M2




















































B ; then by



















































































































where we have used (49) in q
M2



































B the di⁄erence between the RHS and the LHS of













Proof of Proposition 7.
Let us consider the extra research cost in equilibrium M1



















and in equilibrium E1
e CE1 = t
E1
A Nh + t
E1









Using Corollary 1, e CE1 can be rewritten as
e CE1 = t
E1


















￿Nh + ￿M1; (52)

































Recall that teaching quality in equilibrium E1 can be written as













25By substituting from (53) and (52), the above expression can be re-written as

























Let us denote b qM1 the average teaching quality in equilibrium M1, which obtains as






































































B from (54) and using (52), b qM1 can be re-written as



























In what follows we want to exclude that b qM1 ￿ qE1 when e CE1 = e CM1.
In order for b qM1 = qE1 it should be b b = bE1 where bE1 is determined by (25). By concavity of
U(:) this would in turn imply





























which is inconsistent with students￿enrolment in both universities. In order to exclude b qM1 > qE1,
notice that all terms in b qM1 and qE1 are equal with the exception of b b: Then, in order to have
b qM1 > qE1, we should raise b b above bE1. But, from (25), bE1 is the highest possible value of the
tuition fee that can be charged given these values of the non-tuition-fee terms, in the sense that
b b > bE1 would imply





























which is inconsistent with student enrolment in both universities. Then it must be the case that
b qM1 < qE1:￿























B. We show that any level of qE1 = qS
A can be obtained with a
lower public expenditure in equilibrium E1 than in equilibrium S.








































￿Nh ￿ ￿S + tS
AN:
Substituting tS






































Let us now compare the teaching quality in the two equilibria. At equilibrium S, teaching



















Substituting from (58) and (59), qS
A can be written as
qS













which is lower than












because bE1 > bS
A as bE1 is the solution to
Ul ￿
qE1￿
￿ bE1 = 0;
while bS






Proof of Proposition 9.
Condition (40) is the stability condition for equilibrium E2 which contradicts condition (37) for
the existence of equilibrium S. Condition (41) contradicts the stability conditions (17) and (22) for
equilibria Mk; k = 1;2. Condition (42) from Corollary 2 guarantees the existence of equilibrium
E2:
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